\u3ci\u3eBrulotte\u3c/i\u3e\u27s Web by Hovenkamp, Herbert J.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2015 
Brulotte's Web 
Herbert J. Hovenkamp 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Courts Commons, Economic Policy Commons, 
Intellectual Property Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the 
Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons 
Repository Citation 
Hovenkamp, Herbert J., "Brulotte's Web" (2015). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1783. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1783 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
1 
 
BRULOTTE’S WEB 
Herbert Hovenkamp
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment
1
 the Supreme Court decided that stare decisis required it to 
adhere to the half-century-old, much criticized rule in Brulotte v. Thys.
2
 Justice Douglas’s 
Brulotte opinion concluded that license agreements requiring the payment of royalties measured 
by use of a patent after its expiration are unenforceable per se. The court need not inquire into 
market power nor anticompetitive effects, effects on innovation, and it may not accept any 
defense. If the agreement bases royalties on post-expiration patent use it is unlawful. Congress 
can change the rule if it wants to, but has resisted many invitations to do so. 
Well-deserved criticism of Brulotte came from both subsequent lower courts who felt bound 
by the Supreme Court decision
3
 and also from academic commentary. As these various critics 
observed, once a patent has expired its discovery enters the public domain. As a result post-
expiration royalties cannot serve to increase the duration of a patent’s power to exclude. They 
simply require a wealth transfer from the contracting licensee to the patentee.
4
 Second, even for 
that licensee the Brulotte decision was based on a discredited leverage theory of extraction. A 
licensee’s willingness-to-pay for a patent depends on the value of that patent in its own 
production process. The payment can be spread out over a longer period or a shorter one, but one 
cannot simply leverage additional royalties by extending the term of payment. A licensee would 
insist on an offsetting lower royalty as compensation for the longer payout period.
5
 Third, 
extended royalties can often perform an amortization function, decreasing per period costs but 
spreading them out over a longer period—such as the decision between a 15-year and 30-year 
mortgage. As the discussion below develops, courts recognized these deficiencies and often 
construed Brulotte narrowly. 
In settlement of patent litigation Marvel, owner of the Spiderman comic book and movie 
franchise, purchased a patent from Stephen Kimble. The patent was alleged to read on a hand-
held toy “Web Blaster” enabling a child to throw foam strands resembling spider webs. The 
purchase price was a lump sum plus a 3-percent royalty on future sales to continue indefinitely as 
long the market for such sales continued.
6
 At the time Marvel did not foresee how successful and 
long lasting the Spiderman movie franchise would be, and therefore how long the market for this 
particular toy would last. Further, none of the negotiating parties were aware of the Supreme 
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Court’s Brulotte decision making post-expiration royalty provisions unenforceable per se.
7
 The 
Court observed that in Brulotte the patentee retained ownership of the patent while charging 
prolonged royalties, while in Kimble the patent was assigned to Marvel, but it placed no 
significance on this fact and “no one disputes that Brulotte covers a transaction structured in that 
alternative way.”
8
 Upon the patent’s expiration Marvel brought a declaratory judgment action 
seeking to avoid the royalties. In 2013 the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that 
Brulotte precluded further payment. While the court was quite critical of the Brulotte holding, it 
concluded that it was bound by the Supreme Court’s earlier decision.
9
 
The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that it had always regarded a patent’s expiration date as 
a “cut-off” precluding post-expiration enforcement.
10
 It conceded that Brulotte may bar certain 
agreements that benefit the parties, such as smaller payments extending for a longer term.
11
 
However, it also observed that they could often “find ways around Brulotte, enabling them to 
achieve those same ends.”
12
 For example, royalties could be computed over the term while the 
patent was in force, but the actual payment could be amortized over a longer term.
13
 The Court 
re-emphasized a distinction that Brulotte had made between payments computed by post-
expiration sales or usage, which was unlawful, and extended payments that were made for sales 
or usage that had occurred prior to patent expiration. 
The Court also noted that when a device is covered by multiple patents, royalties could run 
until the “latest-running patent covered in the parties’ agreement expires.” It then added, 
however, that if patent rights and nonpatent rights are combined in a single license, then the 
royalty must be reduced when the last patent licensed under the agreement expires. For example, 
“a license involving both a patent and a trade secret can set a 5-percent royalty during the patent 
period (as compensation for the two combined) and a 4-percent royalty afterward (as payment 
for the trade secret alone).”
14
 The Court also observed that Brulotte did not impose any bar on 
joint ventures or other technology sharing ventures that involve joint risk taking.
15
 
The Court rejected Kimble’s argument that the situation should be governed by something 
akin to antitrust’s rule of reason, evaluating market power and effects on a case by case basis.
16
 
This would be a significant departure from Brulotte’s per se rule, however, and the Court felt 
bound by stare decisis, even if that entails “sticking to some wrong decisions.”
17
 In this case 
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there was no “special justification,” or factor urging the Court to reverse course other than the 
simple belief that the former case was wrongly decided.
18
 
The Court also observed that stare decisis is particularly powerful in cases involving 
statutory interpretation because losing litigants can readily make their case to Congress. In this 
case they had done so but Congress had “spurned multiple opportunities to reverse Brulotte—
openings as frequent and clear as this Court ever sees.”
19
 After summarizing these opportunities 
and the actual statutory changes that were made, the Court concluded that “Congress’s continual 
reworking of the patent laws—but never of the Brulotte rule—further supports leaving the 
decision in place.”
20
 
The Court believed that the argument for stare decisis was strong in this case because it 
involved both property (patents) and contracts (licensing agreements)—areas in which reliance 
interests have traditionally been strong and judicial overruling of prior precedents can be quite 
disruptive. In fact, the Brulotte rule has never “proved unworkable.”
21
 Mainly, it catches people 
such as the present litigants who did not know about it. Also speaking in its favor is its simplicity 
when compared with the cumbersome rule of reason that Kimble wanted to put in its place, a rule 
that produces “notoriously high litigation costs and unpredictable results.”
22
 As a result “trading 
in Brulotte for the rule of reason would make the law less, not more, workable than it is now.”
23
 
The court also rejected Kimble’s argument that Brulotte erroneously found competitive harm 
in post-expiration royalties. First, a long royalty period translates into lower royalties during the 
patent term. Second, the requirement of post-expiration payments would act as an inducement to 
new firms to enter the market upon the patent’s expiration.
24
 The Court did not disagree that a 
“broad scholarly consensus” generally supported Kimble’s view about lack of anticompetitive 
effects. Here, the Court distinguished between antitrust cases, in which a showing of economic 
misguidance might call for overruling, and a patent case. In antitrust the Court had felt 
“relatively free to revise our legal analysis as economic understanding evolves” and to reverse 
old precedents. However the very meaning of antitrust provisions that use language such as 
“restrain trade” calls for economic analysis. Brulotte, however, was a patent case, not an antitrust 
case.
25
 “By contrast with the Sherman Act, the patent laws do not turn over exceptional law-
shaping authority to the courts.”
26
 
Further, the Court observed, Brulotte never really hinged on economic analysis at all. Rather, 
it employed a “categorical principle that all patents, and all benefits from them, must end when 
their terms expire.” Thus “patent (not antitrust) policy gave rise to the Court’s conclusion that 
post-patent royalty contracts are unenforceable—utterly ‘regardless of a demonstrable effect on 
competition.’”
27
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Finally, the Court found no factual support for Kimble’s argument that a bar on post-
expiration royalties operates as a drag on innovation. The Court concluded that it “just cannot 
say” on the basis of the evidence in front of it: 
Neither Kimble nor his amici have offered any empirical evidence connecting Brulotte to 
decreased innovation; they essentially ask us to take their word for the problem. And the 
United States, which acts as both a licensor and a licensee of patented inventions while 
also implementing patent policy, vigorously disputes that Brulotte has caused any 
“significant real-world economic harm.” Truth be told, if forced to decide that issue, we 
would not know where or how to start.
28
 
Further, 
Claims that a statutory precedent has “serious and harmful consequences” for innovation 
are (to repeat this opinion’s refrain) “more appropriately addressed to Congress.” That 
branch, far more than this one, has the capacity to assess Kimble’s charge that Brulotte 
suppresses technological progress. And if it concludes that Brulotte works such harm, 
Congress has the prerogative to determine the exact right response—choosing the policy 
fix, among many conceivable ones, that will optimally serve the public interest. As we 
have noted, Congress legislates actively with respect to patents, considering concerns of 
just the kind Kimble raises. In adhering to our precedent as against such complaints, we 
promote the rule-of-law values to which courts must attend while leaving matters of 
public policy to Congress.
29
 
Justice Alito (Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas) dissented. He observed 
that, whether or not the Brulotte rule was justified by antitrust policy, it was clearly not justified 
by patent policy. “That decision was not based on anything that can plausibly be regarded as an 
interpretation of the terms of the Patent Act.”
30
 Rather, it was based on economic theory that had 
subsequently been “debunked.”
31
 Further, the decision interferes with the parties’ ability to 
negotiate agreements that reflect the “true value” of a patent: 
Whatever the merits of this economic argument, it does not represent a serious attempt to 
interpret the Patent Act. A licensing agreement that provides for the payment of royalties 
after a patent’s term expires does not enlarge the patentee’s monopoly or extend the term 
of the patent. It simply gives the licensor a contractual right. Thus, nothing in the text of 
the Act even arguably forbids licensing agreements that provide for post-expiration 
royalties.
32
 
As a result, Brulotte was a “bald act of policymaking”—not simply a case of “incorrect statutory 
interpretation. It was not really statutory interpretation at all.”
33
 Further, its economic reasoning 
had been “soundly refuted” over the intervening 50 years.
34
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The dissenters observed that no language in the patent act expresses any preference as 
between royalty term agreements that call for higher royalties over a shorter period, as opposed 
to those calling for lower royalties spread over a longer period. The dissenters, unlike the 
majority, found policy-based reasons for overruling Brulotte. They observed that in the presence 
of uncertainty about the future value of a patent, parties might prefer to negotiate a lower royalty 
for the immediate future, but continue payments down the road after the innovation has proven 
successful. The Brulotte rule serves to limit the parties’ discretion in ways that will not reflect 
their full range of risk preferences, thus forcing them to execute suboptimal agreements. “The 
sort of agreements that Brulotte prohibits would allow licensees to spread their costs, while also 
allowing patent holders to capitalize on slow-developing inventions.”
35
 
The dissent also argued that because neither party had been aware of the Brulotte rule their 
contractual expectations at the time they negotiated the license agreement were “shattered.”
36
 It 
even expressed surprise at the majority’s suggestion that “some parties have come to rely on 
Brulotte.” Of course, as a general proposition negotiating parties are objectively expected to 
know what the law is, and the Brulotte rule is widely cited and nearly always vilified in books 
about patent law, antitrust law, and licensing. One must expect that most knowledgeable persons 
involved in negotiating patent licenses know about it. 
The dissenters were not persuaded by the majority’s distinction between patent and antitrust 
law. To be sure, “we have been more willing to reexamine antitrust precedents because they have 
attributes of common-law decisions.”
37
 But in this case Brulotte was not an exercise in serious 
statutory interpretation. Rather it “was an antitrust decision masquerading as a patent case.”
38
 As 
a result it “makes no sense to afford greater stare decisis protection to Brulotte’s thinly veiled 
antitrust reasoning than to our Sherman Act decisions.”
39
 
II. DID KIMBLE CHANGE ANYTHING? 
Kimble did not address most of the large variety of practices that lower courts have found to 
implicate Brulotte. Over a half century, as the Court indicated, the patent licensing community 
and the Courts have come to live with Brulotte. The best interpretation of Kimble is that it left 
this “Brulotte jurisprudence” untouched. Kimble involved a license agreement for a single patent, 
while Brulotte involved a license agreement covering twelve patents, of which seven were 
actually incorporated in the machine that Brulotte purchased. The royalty payment issue arose 
after all seven patents had expired.
40
 
Most of the case law under Brulotte has involved agreements that are more complex than a 
simple license for a single patent. Some have involved multiple patents with different expiration 
dates. Others have involved license agreements that cover both patents and trade secrets. Some, 
such as Brulotte itself, have involved patents attached to a device. Others have involved a pure 
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patent license given to a manufacturer who then embodied the patent(s) in its technology.
41
 
Kimble itself involved an assignment of the patent from the patentee to Marvel, who then 
licensed out the manufacture of the Spiderman hand covered by the patent. The perpetual 
payments that the contract called for were strictly speaking not a license at all, but rather the 
purchase price of the assigned patent. 
In addition, the courts have considered whether Brulotte applies to such agreements as a 
patent license that requires a royalty on the licensee’s output of some product made with the 
patented device or process. That product might be unpatented or it might be covered by different 
patents than the ones subject to the challenged agreement. In any event, the dispute arises when 
the patents on the device or process expire, but the agreement calls for ongoing royalties on the 
products made with it. 
A. Kimble and “Hybrid” IP Transactions 
The Kimble decision stated: 
Under Brulotte, royalties may run until the latest-running patent covered in the parties’ 
agreement expires.
42
 Too, post-expiration royalties are allowable so long as tied to a non-
patent right—even when closely related to a patent.
43
 That means, for example, that a 
license involving both a patent and a trade secret can set a 5% royalty during the patent 
period (as compensation for the two combined) and a 4% royalty afterward (as payment 
for the trade secret alone).
44
 
While the passage does not say that royalties may run without diminution until the last patent in 
the package expires, Brulotte had suggested as much and that is how the lower courts have 
interpreted it.
45
 By contrast, if non-patent rights are included in the package, then there must be a 
downward adjustment in the royalty when the last patent expires. The Kimble decision did not 
consider what should happen if the contract does not require an adjustment. 
What the Kimble Court stated is consistent with the case law under Brulotte: the parties could 
negotiate a license for one or more patents and a trade secret that specified a particular royalty 
reduction when the last patent expires.
46
 But what if the contract says nothing? Must a court 
assess and write down the royalty reduction? Or simply deny the licensor the right to collect any 
royalties at all? Most courts conclude the latter: if the agreement does not specify a reduction 
when the last patent expires, royalties are no longer recoverable for the remaining trade secret.
47
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If a license agreement on sales of a patented product provides for a reduction in the royalty 
when the last patent expires, may the remaining royalty be enforced as a simple license on the 
sale of the product? At least one court has said no.
48
 That may make some sense in the world that 
Brulotte creates, provided that no other IP rights were in issue. If the product had simply been 
unpatented, then the licensee could have made it without any license at all. The fact that it was 
patented when the license was negotiated, however, gave the patentee leverage to require the 
longer running royalty stated to run for 25 years. This suggested that the patentee was using the 
leverage of the patent. Another decision queried whether in joint licensing of a patent and a 
trademark the licensor used the patent as additional leverage.
49
 That approach seems 
wrongheaded.
50
 All license negotiations involve “leverage” in the sense that the licensor tries to 
obtain as much as possible while the licensee tries to pay as little.
51
 
The idea that a hybrid license on a patent and a trade secret should call for a royalty reduction 
when the last patent expires makes some intuitive sense in Brulotte’s world if we think of the 
patent as bread and the trade secret as butter—that is, two complementary products that a buyer 
values independently. The two together are much more valuable than either one standing alone. 
A fallacy in this approach is that there is little reason for thinking that a process is worth more to 
a licensee when it is covered by both a patent and a trade secret than when it is covered by only a 
single right. What the licensee wants is access to a technology that reduces its costs or improves 
the quality of its output. Those numbers are determined by market value and product 
competition, and are not obviously affected by the number and kind of IP rights that they 
embody. For example, the price I am willing to pay for a patented weed killer for my back yard 
depends on the price and availability of alternatives and how much I am willing to pay for a 
weedless yard. My willingness to pay is not higher because I know that production of the weed 
killer is protected by a trade secret as well as a patent. In that case the Kimble-authorized royalty 
reduction when the patent in this patent/trade secret license drops out is simply a device for 
complying with Brulotte, not something that reflects a reduction in value that occurs when the 
patent drops out of the picture. 
Of course, the patent and the trade secret might cover two different, severable things. For 
example, the process for producing the weed killer might be protected by a trade secret while the 
resulting product itself might be patented. In that case the value of the trade secret after the 
patent expires will depend on the viability and number of alternative processes for producing the 
same product, which is now in the public domain. If the trade secret is iron clad—that is, if there 
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are no known alternatives for making this product—then the trade secret might be worth just as 
much alone as the combination of a patent and trade secret were together. The Brulotte rule 
assumes, incorrectly, that the combination of a patent and a trade secret is always worth more 
than the trade secret standing alone. 
Brulotte itself recognized that when patents are licensed in packages, as opposed to the 
combination of a patent and a trade secret, then no royalty reduction is called for as long as at 
least one patent in the package remains valid. This answer is critical, because licensing of patents 
in packages is much more common today than it was when Brulotte was decided, particularly in 
information technologies. Technology pools or standard setting arrangements often involve large 
numbers of licensed patents, many of which have never been evaluated in litigation. Further, 
they do not appear to fit within Kimble’s acknowledged exception for joint ventures of multiple 
parties who are developing “an invention.”
52
 For example, the MPEG LA pool contains more 
than 5,000 patents related to digital video creation, dissemination, and display.
53
 Each licensee 
individually has a product line, which includes everything from digital cameras (independent and 
contained in cellphones), televisions, computer monitors and other display devices, digital 
editing software, and storage devices. Some licensees are competitors; others are producing 
complementary products. For the most part they are not engaged in joint production of products. 
Licensee members pay a scheduled royalty for indemnified access to the patents in the pool, or 
some subset of it. On a rolling basis new patents come into the pool while others expire and there 
is no instant when there are no unexpired patents in the pool. As a result, the Brulotte rule should 
never apply. 
Brulotte itself had concluded that the agreement could not be enforced “after the last of the 
patents incorporated into the machines had expired.”
54
 It then cited Automatic Radio—a decision 
from which Justice Douglas had dissented—for the proposition that although some of the patents 
in the blanket license at issue had expired, not all of them had. As a result the Court upheld that 
agreement without requiring any royalty reduction upon individual patent expiration.
55
 
Automatic Radio, which had been decided in 1950, involved a package license of 570 
patents, which was very large for that day.
56
 Hazeltine Research, the patentee, was a non-
practicing entity
57
 engaged in researching and licensing technology for radios. Its business 
method was to charge radio manufacturers a 1-percent royalty on its entire patent portfolio on a 
rolling basis. As patents expired they were dropped but as new patents were approved they 
automatically became part of the pool.
58
 The entire package was licensed at a single price, with 
no attempt to allocate royalties among individual patents. Manufacturer Automatic Radio had 
challenged this arrangement by comparing it to antitrust tying: it complained that it was forced to 
take the patents it did not want as a condition of obtaining those that it did.
59
 The Court observed 
and approved the conclusion of both lower courts that the package license “was a convenient 
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mode of operation designed by the parties to avoid the necessity of determining whether each 
type of petitioner’s product embodies any of the numerous Hazeltine patents.”
60
 Further, the 
Court concluded, simply fixing the royalty as a percentage of each licensee’s total sales was “the 
most convenient method of fixing the business value of the privileges granted.”
61
 
In sum, the best reading of Brulotte/Kimble is that the post-expiration royalty problem does 
not arise until the moment that a license agreement no longer contains any unexpired patents. It 
does not matter if the patents in question were explicitly covered when the agreement was 
created or whether they were added later. 
Automatic Radio also indicates that Brulotte does not apply to contractual determination of 
the royalty base. For example, a patentee might base its royalty on a total product sales price 
even though the patented technology is only a small part of the product. The courts have 
consistently agreed, for both devices and process patents, and nothing in Kimble changes that 
outcome.
62
 
As a drafting matter, the trick for agreements involving multiple IP rights is to load as much 
of the royalty as possible on the rights that will last the longest time. For example, a license that 
placed all the royalties on the trade secret and permitted such licensees to practice the patent 
without royalty would not face a Brulotte issue. 
B. Patent/Device Combinations 
A second type of “hybrid” transaction is the combination of a patent and a device that embodies 
the patent. As a general proposition the purchase of a device covered by patents includes an 
implied license to practice the patents consistent with the ordinarily anticipated uses of that 
device.
63
 For example, the purchaser of a patented weed killer receives an implied license to 
practice the invention by applying it to her yard. That implied license does not include the right 
to duplicate the compound and sell it to others. Often sales or lease transactions for goods 
covered by patents make no reference to patents and do not charge a separate royalty. That is so 
even for devices that might incorporate large numbers of patents, such as a computer, 
smartphone, or automobile. Not even the most expansive reading of Brulotte contemplates a 
price reduction upon patent expiration in these cases. That is even true of leases with ongoing 
payment obligations, and even when the payment is metered to usage, thus making it resemble a 
patent license. For example, the lease of a truck at a rate of $2,000 per year plus 10 cents per 
mile is not likely to make explicit reference to any patents. No court has required that the lease 
rate be reduced as various patents embodied in the truck expire, even if the truck reaches 20 
years old and all of them have expired. 
                                                          
60
 Id. (citing Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 77 F. Supp. 493, 496 (D. Mass 
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61
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10 
 
In Zila the Ninth Circuit observed that Brulotte had involved “the sale of a physical machine 
along with a use license.” As a result, Brulotte clearly applied to at least some combinations of 
the sale of a patented good and a patent license.
64
 The facts of Brulotte don’t quite support the 
Ninth Circuit’s characterization, however. As stated by the Washington Supreme Court: 
The plaintiff Thys Company, of which Mr. Edouard Thys, an inventor, was and is the 
president, holds numerous duly issued patents on mechanical hop-picking machines. The 
defendants are hop farmers who purchased portable hop-picking machines from sellers 
other than the plaintiff. In connection with the purchase of these machines, which 
embodied devices patented by the plaintiff, each defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff 
royalties for the use of his machine for a period which was to end 17 years after the date 
the machine was first sold by the plaintiff. The royalties were to be paid at the rate of 
$3.33 1/3 per two hundred pounds of hops harvested with the machines, and in any event 
a minimum royalty of $500 per year was to be paid for the use of each machine.
65
 
In other words, the arrangement in this case resembled a reach through royalty by a separate 
patentee rather than a sale by a manufacturer of a machine that embodied the manufacturer’s 
own patent. Edouard Thys was an inventor and the owner of Thys Iron and Steel Foundry in 
Sacramento. His father-in-law was a hops farmer with extensive land holdings.
66
 The principal 
patent, which Thys apparently licensed to manufacturers, was for a device that separated the 
useable part of the hops plant from stems and other debris.
67
 Under the arrangement the 
manufacture was merely an intermediary with respect to the patent. 
In Kimble, by contrast, Marvel actually acquired the patent by assignment and the purchase 
price called for indefinite royalty-like payments as long as the patent was practiced. The Court 
observed that no one had disputed that Brulotte applied to this transaction.
68
 In fact, however, 
Marvel was not licensing a patent. Rather it was paying a purchase price predicated on the 
number of uses that would be made of the patent for the commercial life of the product to which 
it was attached. Neither Brulotte nor Kimble involved the “classic” story of the sale of a device 
combined with a separate per use license for a patent that read on the device. 
Once again, the drafting trick is to load the price onto the device instead of the patent. If the 
Brulotte transaction had simply been restructured as a purchase of the hop-picking machine at a 
price that depended on usage, no patent issue would have arisen. Of course, that might be 
difficult to do when the patentee and the manufacturer are separate entities. 
Product prices that vary with usage can be valuable second degree price discrimination 
devices, enabling the seller of the machine to obtain different rates of return from different 
buyers. In second degree price discrimination a seller puts out a price schedule and purchasers 
“select” the price, typically by their amount of usage. Second degree price discrimination can 
increase output by reaching more marginal customers who would not purchase otherwise. In 
                                                          
64
 Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2007). 
65
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such cases it very likely increases economic welfare as well.
69
 The alternative, third degree price 
discrimination, is typically inferior. Under third degree price discrimination the seller must 
identify ex ante who places a higher value on the device, segregate the customers by groups, and 
then charge them different prices. Third degree price discrimination can also be efficient when it 
increases output, but it rarely results in so precise a result as per use prices do.
70
 
C. “Leveraged” Patent Packages 
In Brulotte both the majority opinion
71
 and Justice Harlan’s dissent
72
 spoke about the use of a 
patent to “leverage” additional royalty payments. As a general proposition, today leverage 
theories are in disrepute. When two goods are complements, such as a machine and a patent 
license needed to operate the machine, willingness to pay depends on the buyer’s value for the 
combination. In this case the license to practice the patent is valuable to the hop farmer only if 
attached to the machine, and while under patent the machine has no value without a license to 
practice the patent. Because the buyer needs both, its willingness to pay for one is determined by 
the price of the other. Ordinarily a buyer will pay more for a leveraged complementary product 
only if it receives an offsetting discount on the other product.
73
 
The peculiarities of the Brulotte rule create leveraging possibilities, however. For example, 
suppose a licensee would like to license a patent with three years remaining. The patentee has 
recently patented a secondary invention that still has 15 years remaining. Leveraging is possible 
in this situation if the parties’ anticipate that the licensee will be more profitable in the future 
than it is currently. The patentee insists on bundling the two together in order to take advantage 
of Brulotte’s rule that no royalty reduction is called for until the last patent in the package 
expires. In an extreme case the licensee may place no value at all on the second patent, not even 
intending to practice it in its technology. In Rocform the Sixth Circuit found patent misuse when 
the owner of a highly desired patent required licensees to take longer-lived patents as well, with 
no reduction in royalties when the desired patent expired. A dissenter would have required proof 
of market power.
74
 
The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988 effectively codifies the dissent’s position. That 
statute permits a challenge to someone who has “conditioned the license of any right to the 
patent . . . on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent” only if the licensor has 
“market power in the relevant market for the patent . . . on which the license . . . is 
conditioned.”
75
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 See Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
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D. Reach-Through Royalties 
Both Brulotte and Kimble make clear that the post-expiration rule applies only to royalties that 
are measured by reference to post-expiration production or use.
76
 The rule does not apply when 
payments stretch out beyond the patent’s expiration but the obligation in question was accrued 
prior to expiration. For example, suppose that a patent license called for royalties of 3 percent of 
sales for the life of the patent, but during that period payment was limited to 2 percent of sales. 
Upon the patent’s expiration roughly one-third of this obligation would remain unpaid, but no 
royalties are being accrued during the post-expiration period. Under Brulotte, the remaining 
royalties-in-arrears could be paid. By contrast, if the agreement simply called for ongoing 
payment of 2 percent of sales for 25 years, then the contract would no longer be enforceable 
upon the patent’s expiration and the licensee would have no obligation to pay royalties after that 
point. 
This is one area where the Brulotte rule has the potential to limit efficient risk sharing 
behavior. Researchers in some areas often require costly patented research tools, or inputs, that 
may produce considerable value once a successful product has been developed. One example is 
Harvard University’s legendary OncoMouse, a patented, genetically engineered mouse that was 
particularly useful in cancer research.
77
 At the time the mouse is needed the research in question 
is still in progress and with an uncertain outcome. The research might succeed in producing a 
highly valuable drug but there is also a high chance that it will fail. A rational way to price out 
such an asset is conditionally, perhaps with little or no royalty up front during the research 
period, but with a substantial royalty down the road if the research project should succeed.
78
 
Depending on the age of the patent and the timeline for the project, this could easily contemplate 
the payment of royalties on the pharmaceutical drug long after the patent on the OncoMouse 
expires. In that case royalties are charged beyond the expiration of the patent, but they are 
measured by the sale of the innovated product, often a pharmaceutical drug. While the 
pharmaceutical drug is very likely also patented, it is not the same patent as the one on the 
OncoMouse. 
In the Bayer case the court rejected the licensee’s argument that Brulotte precluded royalties 
on the resulting product once the patent on the research product expired.
79
 It reasoned that the 
royalties paid on the product were actually compensation for use of the research tool, and the 
research had been completed prior to the patent’s expiration. Nevertheless, one of the royalty 
                                                          
76
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provisions in question did provide for a “royalty for sales of pharmaceutical products discovered 
using the subject invention.”
80
 
A lively debate has emerged about the economics of reach through royalties, with some 
believing that they contribute to a patent “thicket” that is difficult for researchers to negotiate,
81
 
and others arguing that they constitute a reasonable form of risk sharing.
82
 That issue is a serious 
one and should never be addressed by any rule as ham handed as the Brulotte per se rule against 
post-expiration royalties. In fact, the risk-sharing argument makes a great deal of sense. If the 
owner of the OncoMouse patent had simply contributed a large amount of research cash up front 
in exchange for a stated percentage of sales of a successful product, the transaction would raise 
no patent law issues and there is little reason for thinking a court would invalidate it. 
III. MAKING ANTITRUST POLICY VIA PATENT LAW: MISUSE 
Procedurally, neither Brulotte nor Kimble was a patent misuse case. Misuse is raised as a defense 
to a patent infringement claim and, when it succeeds, makes the patent unenforceable against all 
infringers until the misused is “purged.”
83
 By contrast, Brulotte arose as a defense to a state law 
breach of contract claim seeking to recover unpaid patent royalties.
84
 Kimble was a declaratory 
judgment action seeking to have Brulotte applied to the Kimble/Marvel license agreement.
85
 
Nevertheless, Brulotte has often been likened to patent misuse, and for good reason. 
Although Brulotte is not an antitrust case, its stated rationale seems to rest more on competition 
policy than on anything articulated in patent policy. That is also true of most cases of patent 
misuse. Justice William O. Douglas, Brulotte’s author, certainly thought so. He compared the 
Brulotte royalty extension to a tying arrangement in which the patentee attempted to leverage 
additional royalties by conditioning a license for the term of the patent on the licensee’s 
agreement to continue paying royalties after the patent expired. In the process it was attempting 
to enlarge the scope of the lawful patent monopoly.
86
 
Today consensus is widespread that patent misuse doctrine seriously exaggerated the social 
harm that might result from certain patent licensing practices, particularly tying arrangements 
and related practices where an antitrust-style structural analysis would indicate no competitive 
harm.
87
 That was equally true of Brulotte’s per se rule. In the great majority of cases Brulotte 
forecloses arrangements that would otherwise benefit both parties and not injure anyone else—
particularly in cases where extended payments serve to amortize or stretch out obligations. As so 
                                                          
80
 Bayer, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 468. 
81
 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust 
Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399 (2003). 
82
 E.g., Bohannan, supra note 80; CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 282–85 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012). 
83
 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 5, ¶ 1781. 
84
 See Thys Co. v. Brulotte, 62 Wash. 2d 284, 382 P.2d 271 (1963) (approving and enforcing the royalty 
agreement). 
85
 See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2406 (2015). 
86
 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the 
Scope of the Patent, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
87
 E.g., Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488; Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 29 
(1931). 
14 
 
many patent misuse cases, it found patent licensing conduct to be anticompetitive without ever 
considering how the conduct excluded anyone or facilitated market wide price fixing. 
Kimble should not be read, however, as a call for a general revival of patent misuse doctrine. 
Indeed, the Court indicated its disapproval of the antitrust economics that seemed to be inherent 
in Brulotte. This was a stare decisis decision, pure and simple. 
IV. AVOIDING THE FEDERAL QUESTION 
The Brulotte rule is strictly a creature of federal patent law. As noted earlier, the fact that 
Brulotte came to the court via a state law contract suit makes it unusual, giving the Supreme 
Court an opportunity to make federal patent policy out of a transaction historically within the 
domain of state commercial law. Given that the Patent Act itself says almost nothing about the 
permissible terms of licensing agreements, Brulotte represented a significant expansion of 
federal patent jurisdiction. 
Although Brulotte is clearly part of patent law—a point that Kimble re-emphasized
88
—
Brulotte issues are not ordinarily within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit because 
the cases do not typically arise under 35 U.S.C.
89
 Kimble itself came from the Ninth Circuit, and 
Judge Richard Posner’s Scheiber decision severely criticizing but following Brulotte came 
through the Seventh Circuit.
90
 This is also in contrast to ordinary patent “misuse” law. Because 
claims of patent misuse are nearly always asserted as defenses to patent infringement suits, today 
the Federal Circuit hears nearly all of them. 
Nonetheless, Brulotte acquires its federal status only because a patent is present. The 
decision expressly distinguished situations “where non-patented articles are marketed at prices 
based on use.”
91
 It also stated that: 
The sale or lease of unpatented machines on long-term payments based on a deferred 
purchase price or on use would present wholly different considerations. Those 
arrangements seldom rise to the level of a federal question.
92
 
This language has turned out to be important because Brulotte was making patent policy, an area 
traditionally subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, at least since the 1830s.
93
 As a result, the 
best way to avoid Brulotte altogether is to avoid the patent. This became clear a little more than a 
decade after Brulotte when the Supreme Court decided the Aronson case.
94
 The licensee had 
agreed to pay a relatively high royalty on the licensor’s key holder, which was subject to a patent 
application. The parties also agreed that if no patent issued within five years the royalty rate 
would be lower. In fact, the PTO rejected the application on nonobviousness grounds, the Eighth 
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Circuit affirmed, and no patent ever issued.
95
 That left the licensee with a royalty obligation that 
ran for the commercial life of the product. The Supreme Court held that since no patent had ever 
issued Brulotte did not apply. Rather, the challenged licensee agreement was merely a contract, 
which “traditionally are the domain of state law” even if “the contract relates to intellectual 
property which may or may not be patentable.”
96
 Lower courts have generally confined Quick 
Point to situations where no patent issued. A few have even indicated that the contract must 
provide for a lower royalty rate if the patent does not issue than if it does.
97
 The Ninth Circuit 
characterized that as an overreading of Brulotte.
98
 
So another oddity of Brulotte is that an inventor can actually obtain greater royalties if it 
patent application fails than if it succeeds. So far, apparently no one has intentionally abandoned 
a patent application after entering a contract such as the one in Aronson, although the incentive is 
clear, at least in cases where the market is unlikely to be flooded with competitors. 
V. JOINT VENTURES AND OTHER TECHNOLOGY SHARING ARRANGEMENTS 
The Kimble decision defended the Brulotte rule as being “simplicity itself to apply.” All a court 
must ask is “whether a licensing agreement provides royalties for post-expiration use of a patent. 
If not, no problem; if so, no dice.”
99
 On the particular facts of Brulotte and Kimble that may be 
true, but as this article suggests the Court was overlooking many complicating factors that the 
lower courts have had to confront over the half century since Brulotte was decided. 
Kimble also held that the Brulotte rule “poses no bar to business arrangements other than 
royalties—all kinds of joint ventures, for example—that enable the parties to share the risks and 
rewards of commercializing an invention.”
100
 This exception seems odd, given that there is 
virtually no case law applying Brulotte to technology sharing within joint ventures.
101
 Justice 
Kagan was apparently thinking of a joint venture to develop a particular patented device. For 
example, the well known Berkey Photo antitrust decision in the Second Circuit involved a joint 
venture between Kodak and General Electric to develop a disposable flash cube for a small 
compact camera.
102
 Depending on who did the production and marketing, such an agreement 
would very likely involve cross licensing of patents. Kimble may then stand for the proposition 
that as long as production of such a device developed or produced jointly continues, underlying 
financial arrangements may continue, even if some of them take the form of royalties on now 
expired patents. Or to state it differently, Brulotte applies when the relationship between the 
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parties is as licensor and licensee and there is no additional integration of research, production, 
or distribution. 
Reach through royalties of the kind approved in the Bayer case, discussed above, could also 
fall into the category of joint ventures as well without too much linguistic overreaching. 
Contractual provision of a research input is certainly joint innovative activity. If that is so there is 
no good reason why royalties on the secondary product could not extend indefinitely, even after 
the patent on the research input expired. 
VI. PRECEDENT: PATENT VS. ANTITRUST LAW 
The Kimble majority made the sensible point that the Patent Act is a detailed code that Congress 
amends frequently. As a result, “the patent laws do not turn over exceptional law-shaping 
authority to the courts.”
103
 By contrast, the highly general formulations of the Sherman Act are 
very little more than an authorization to pursue anticompetitive conduct, saying very little about 
how to identify or remedy it. The Court’s antitrust “rulings necessarily turned on its 
understanding of economics.”
104
 As a result, the Sherman Act has been much more responsive to 
changes in economic theory than the Patent Act, and the “Court has viewed stare decisis as 
having less-than-usual force in cases involving the Sherman Act.”
105
 For this reason the Court 
has felt less bound by stare decisis in antitrust cases, and freer to abandon doctrines later 
considered to be obsolete. In the case of patent doctrine that parties disagreed with, they can 
always “take their objections across the street, and Congress can correct any mistake it sees.”
106
 
The Court observed that Congress had “spurned multiple opportunities to reverse Brulotte,” 
providing a good sized list. Perhaps the most compelling of these is the 1988 Patent Misuse 
Reform Act,
107
 which provided that unilateral refusals to license or ties in the absence of market 
power could be neither misuse nor “illegal extension of the patent right,” a phrase widely 
interpreted as being a reference to antitrust law.
108
 However, Congress chose not to add an 
additional provision addressed to royalty extensions. As the Court summarized, “Congress’s 
continual reworking of the patent laws—but never of the Brulotte rule—further supports leaving 
the decision in place.”
109
 
The Court also suggested that Brulotte itself was not a case about competitive harm, real or 
imagined. The Court’s opinion “did not undertake to assess that practice’s likely competitive 
effects. Instead, it applied a categorical principle that all patents, and all benefits from them, 
must end when their terms expire.”
110
 As a result, Brulotte was a creature of patent policy, not of 
antitrust. That brought a loud objection from Justice Alito in dissent, who complained that if 
Brulotte was an interpretation of the Patent Act, where was the provision that the Court was 
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interpreting? Other than expressly permitting licenses,
111
 the Patent Act says next to nothing 
about the specific provisions contained in license agreements, including the size of the royalty or 
how long the agreement can run. Judge Posner stated similar sentiments in Scheiber, which 
followed but severely criticized Brulotte. He concluded that the decision could not be interpreted 
as a construction of either the Constitution’s IP Clause or the Patent Act. Rather it was a “free-
floating product of a misplaced fear of monopoly.”
112
 
Justice Douglas had seen it differently, however. He had stated in Brulotte that: 
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the 
leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage to project those royalty payments 
beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the 
patent by tying the sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented 
ones.
113
 
The Court had held nearly 20 years earlier that tying arrangements involving patented tying 
products were also illegal per se.
114
 Only three years prior to Brulotte it had extended the per se 
rule to block booking, a form of tying of motion pictures.
115
 So it was not so clear, at least in 
Justice Douglas’s mind, that this case was merely about patent boundaries. Rather, he saw it as a 
simple variant on antitrust tying law, which was already under the per se rule. Douglas himself 
had done something similar in the two Mercoid cases that came before the Court in the 1940s. In 
Mercoid I he wrote the Court’s opinion finding unlawful patent misuse when the owner of a 
patent on a combination of three devices working together insisted on selling all three of them 
together.
116
 In a separate opinion he wrote for the Court that the forced combination also violated 
the antitrust laws.
117
 
The Kimble majority is certainly correct that Brulotte did not call for an analysis of 
competitive effects, but neither did antitrust tying law at the time. Patent ties were illegal per se, 
and the market power requirement was satisfied by a simple showing that the tying product was 
patented.
118
 In an era when antitrust courts often spoke categorically, Brulotte fit right in. 
One problematic effect of Kimble is that antitrust tying law is undergoing a process of 
revision that calls for considerably more analysis today than it did a half century ago and is 
coming close to removing per se illegality.
119
 That has largely happened for just the reasons that 
the Court suggested; that is, the underlying economic theory has changed, deemphasizing 
leverage and emphasizing efficiencies.
120
 By contrast, the patent law of tying arrangements—
heavily borrowed from antitrust—remains stuck in a time warp until Congress gets around to 
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changing it. While that happened in the case of tying law’s market power requirement,
121
 so far it 
has not happened in the case of post-expiration royalties. 
In defending its rule of stare decisis, the Kimble Court also observed that the challenged 
practice involved two areas of law, property (patents) and contract (license agreements). In these 
areas stare decisis has traditionally been regarded as strong, because reliance interests are more 
likely to develop.
122
 
Of course, contract and property law produce different types of reliance interests depending 
on which way the law is changing. A legal regime that previously permitted unlimited licensing 
but then adopted the Brulotte rule could certainly upset a great many reliance interests. Many 
contracts of long duration would become unenforceable or have to be rewritten so as to limit 
their duration to the patent’s remaining life. Settled expectations would be undermined. 
When the legal change is in the other direction, however, the weight of reliance interests is 
less clear. Acting under Brulotte people would have structured shorter or more complex 
agreements around its rule. They might have created a different agreement in a world without 
Brulotte. The principal fear that the Court articulated is that “long-dormant” agreements might 
spring back to life because their duration was no longer limited by the patent expiration rule. 
Presumably, one value of overruling Brulotte legislatively is that the statute could be limited so 
as to exclude agreements that were already executed at the time the statute was passed. Whether 
the Constitution requires that result, however, is not entirely clear. For example, the Supreme 
Court has upheld retroactive extensions in patent and copyright terms.
123
 Further, the Court, if it 
chose, could have made its own overruling prospective, without undermining prior agreements. 
The real impact of overruling would be on those people, who like the parties in Kimble, 
wrote their agreements in ignorance of Brulotte. In such cases the effect of overruling would be 
that these parties would get precisely what they bargained for. 
VII. CONCLUSION: ANTITRUST ALTERNATIVES 
The Kimble Court rejected Kimble’s proposed alternative—namely, that post-expiration royalty 
extensions be addressed under a rule of reason similar to that applied under the antitrust laws. 
The Court found this unacceptable, substituting a bright-line (although ill-conceived) rule for 
something as complex and indeterminate as antitrust’s rule of reason. 
To be sure, the rule of reason is much less “bright line” than the per se rule that Brulotte 
imposed. But the fact is that while nearly every commercial transaction in the country is subject 
to antitrust evaluation under section 1 of the Sherman Act, only a trivial percentage are ever 
found to be unlawful. Contracts licensing patents and requiring post-expiration payments would 
join the general run of agreements that are nearly always legal—even if they stipulate resale 
prices
124
 or impose nonprice distribution restraints.
125
 The only two classes of purely vertical 
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agreements that provoke much antitrust litigation are tying and exclusive dealing, and a simple 
post-expiration royalty agreement does not have any obvious impact restricting the output of 
others. 
In other words, using antitrust rather than patent law to address post-expiration royalties 
would not create nearly the tempest of uncertainty that the Court feared. Nearly all of the 
situations applying it would simply be lawful. A tiny number of cases involving both market 
power and plausible anticompetitive exclusion or restraint on trade might be addressable under 
the antitrust laws. Such an approach would give the parties a better set of tools for managing 
innovation risk in sensible ways. 
